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COMMERCIAL BANKS IN CRIMINAL MONEY LAUNDERING SCHEMES 
 
In today's world, globalization provides an oppor-
tunity for economic agents to carry out free cross-border 
movement of financial resources, and through the bank-
ing system, without any particular obstacles and in 
search of a favorable location for high returns. This, 
however, is a potential opportunity and the money ob-
tained from criminal activity to obtain legal origin 
through established money laundering schemes imple-
mented through commercial banks. The purpose of this 
study is to outline the role of commercial banks as a 
money laundering mechanism by presenting their inhe- 
rent characteristics within the scope of the Special 
Money Laundering Act1 (LMML) and to assess their 
importance as a permanent monitoring and control of 
compliance with the applicable standards against the 
above crimes. 
 
I 
Pursuant to the Law on Credit Institutions2, the 
Bank makes public borrowing or other repayable funds 
and provides loans or other funding at its own expense 
and at its own risk, which is sufficient to justify the suit-
ability of an adequate risk management in the security 
sphere of the credit institution itself; the interests of its 
clients. In this respect, commercial banks can be defined 
as institutions with a significant role in the socio-eco-
nomic life of each country, their financial stability and 
effective management are among the main prerequisites 
for competitiveness and market growth, and their ab-
sence leads to a number of risks3, including legal, ope- 
rational and reputational ones. 
In view of the issue under consideration, the acti- 
vities of credit institutions, the implementation of re-
lated legislation, internal policies and procedures are 
subject to constant monitoring due to the potential for 
them to be used for the purpose of classifying as a crime 
against the financial system in the Penal Code – money 
laundering, which could also be a prerequisite for the 
possible occurrence of risk situations. In addition, it is 
precisely the specific activity of credit institutions that 
the special legislation - the Law on Measures against 
Money Laundering (MIMA) - also obliges them to re- 
gulate the measures for the prevention of these crimes. 
                                                        
1 See Law on Measures Against Money Laundering (last amended 01.01.2017). 
2 See Art. 2, para. 1 of the Credit Institutions Act (last amended SG No. 63 of 04.08.2017). 
3 See more  Bojinov, B. Bank risk management, “Tsenov” Pubishing house, 2016. 
4 See Art. 253 of the Penal Code (last amended SG No. 54 of 05.07.2017). 
5 See Article 2 of the Measures against Money Laundering Act (last amended 01.01.2017). 
Money laundering in the Criminal Code4 is defined 
as a deliberate crime where financial transactions or 
other property transactions are carried out or the origin, 
location, movement or actual property rights known to 
or allegedly acquired through crime or other publicly 
dangerous act. The norm also provides for complicated 
factual chapters, which imply heavier punishments, in 
cases where the offense was committed by a pre-consen-
sus, by a criminal organization, by an official, one or 
more times. Money laundering itself is carried out 
through a series or scheme of financial transactions pre-
dominantly through the use of commercial banks that 
seek to conceal the proceeds of, or the financing of, 
criminal activities, or the illicit origin of the property. 
For the purposes of the Measures against Money Laun-
dering Act, money laundering is associated with the fol-
lowing activities5: 
• the conversion or transfer of property acquired 
from a criminal activity or from an act of participation 
in such an activity in order to conceal or conceal the  
illegal origin of the property or to assist a person in-
volved in such an act in order to avoid the legal con- 
sequences of its act; 
• the concealment or concealment of the nature, 
source, location, location, movement or rights in respect 
of property acquired from a criminal activity or from an 
act of participation in such an activity; 
• the acquisition, possession, possession or use of 
property knowing at the time of receipt that it has been 
acquired from a criminal activity or an act of participa-
tion in such an activity; 
• participating in any of the above-mentioned ac-
tions, association for the purpose of doing so, attempting 
to do so, and assisting, instigating, facilitating the exe-
cution of such an act or disguising it. 
The theoretical and practical-applied analysis of 
the issue in question provides information that "dirty" 
money usually refers to crimes and illegal activities, and 
laundering itself is a subsequent planned crime based on 
imperfections in financial and legal national systems. In 
this line of thought, it is appropriate to point out that the 
planning and organization of criminal schemes is within 
the scope of intelligent and motivated expertise, bearing 
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in mind that for the technical implementation itself, per-
sons with or without a low degree of education and with-
out competences in the role of account holders, owners 
of legal entities, cash mugs, recipients and senders of 
funds through the systems of money transfers, etc. 
The above is enough to "shake" the stability of 
credit institutions as a result of successfully imple-
mented money laundering operations, which in turn re-
quires the development and implementation of money 
laundering prevention tools, part of which is also the 
regulatory framework. For the purpose of this paper, in-
vestigating the place and importance of commercial 
banks in anti-money laundering processes by presenting 
their specific features within the scope of the Special 
Law (MIPA), and following a comprehensive theoreti-
cal and practical-applied analysis, it is logical that 
money laundering is presented as a process with condi-
tionally defined phases: 
• Phase 1: Introduction of criminal assets (incorpo-
ration) into the financial system; 
• Phase 2: Performing complex financial transac-
tions to cover the operations of the previous phase (stra- 
tification); 
• Phase 3: Implementation of complex integration 
schemes to transform "laundered" funds into legally in-
tegrated (integration). 
The very process of money laundering, as a crime 
against the financial system, starts with the introduction 
of property acquired from criminal activity in the finan-
cial system, directly or through the use of retail. This can 
happen both through cash payments of large sums and 
through consecutive contributions of lesser value. For 
example, for the sake of higher liquidity, the initial pro-
ceeds from drug trafficking or from spreading to the 
street are always in cash, but when deposited on a bank 
account they become indistinguishable from legitimate 
earnings from a legitimate business. Consequently, this 
phase is associated with the transformation of the illi- 
citly acquired property in order to make it more difficult 
to identify, but it is also at the highest risk of detecting 
the criminal act due to the contact between the illegally 
acquired money and the financial system. 
The second phase is used to conceal the nature of 
operations from the first phase by performing complex 
financial transactions (without any particular economic 
logic) that seek to erase as soon as possible all links to 
illicitly acquired assets. Shares, bonds, and other highly 
liquid assets are often purchased through funds, or they 
are transferred to bank accounts in other jurisdictions. 
Bank transfers, online and e-banking, bank loans, ficti-
tious transactions, foreign exchange, offshore compa-
nies and bills, etc., are often particularly applicable, 
which are often executed simultaneously to remove the 
link between "dirty money" and criminal sources. It 
should be borne in mind, however, that, unlike financial 
                                                        
1 See Art. 3, para. 1 of the Law on Measures against Money Laundering (last amended 01.01.2017). 
2 See Art. 1 of the Law on Measures against Money Laundering (last amended 01.01.2017). 
transactions carried out with legally acquired funds 
seeking economic gains and / or minimizing costs, it is 
not necessary to deal with money acquired illegally not 
necessarily a profit or a minimization of costs, and the 
sole aim is to acquire the same legal origin. Thus, money 
laundering is actually implemented within this phase. 
The next phase relates to the return of legalized 
cash back to the economy in such a way that at the en-
trance of the financial system they seem like ordinary 
legitimate business assets. For this purpose, complex in-
tegration schemes are realized – for example purchase 
of real estate, business assets, securities, provision of 
collateral, etc. property is invested in the legal economy, 
which presumably defines the financial resource as le-
gally acquired. There are also many techniques inherent 
in legitimate business, with the goal of increasing reve-
nue and reducing tax liabilities. Therefore, this phase is 
the most complicated of Ch. disclosure of the illicit 
origin of capital, but at the same time it is also taken as 
a culmination in any successful money laundering ope- 
ration. 
In the context of the issue under discussion, in or-
der to counteract the money laundering offense at each 
of the above phases, the legislature approves in the spe-
cial rule (LMML), and the obligated persons, incl. and 
commercial banks apply as measures to prevent the use 
of the financial system for the purposes of money laun-
dering the following1: 
• identify customers and verify their identification; 
• identifying the actual owner of the client - a legal 
entity, and undertaking appropriate actions to verify its 
identification; 
• collecting information from the client about the 
purpose and nature of the relationship that has been or 
is to be established with it; 
• ongoing monitoring of established business or 
professional relationships, and verification of transac-
tions and transactions performed within these relation-
ships, the extent to which they correspond to available 
customer information, business and risk profile, includ-
ing clarification of the origin of funds in cases referred 
to by law; 
• disclosure of suspicious transactions, transac-
tions, and customers. 
The abovementioned essential characteristics and 
normative justification of the money laundering pro-
cesses are sufficient grounds for each commercial bank 
to set up a specialized money laundering and anti-money 
laundering agency in its structure to organize and mon-
itor the implementation of the legal measures2. 
In summary, each commercial bank should carry 
out controls and prevent money laundering in accord-
ance with the provisions of national laws and relevant 
international regulations and best practices by develop-
ing its own policy. The main purpose of the abovemen- 
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tioned anti-money laundering measures is to "block" the 
relationship between credit institutions and criminals. 
 
II 
In order to have an anti-money laundering effect, it 
is necessary to develop and strictly implement policies 
both nationally and internationally. At supranational 
level, anti-money laundering policy is determined by the 
activity of a number of institutions, including the Finan-
cial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF – 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering1), 
Committee of Experts on Measures against Money 
Laundering at the Council of Europe (MONEYVAL 
Committee2), Union to enhance the interaction  
between financial intelligence units around the world 
(EGMONT GROUP3), The Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision (Basel Committee of Banking Supervi-
sion4), The World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund and others. For the implementation of the interna-
tional and national regulations regarding the prevention 
of money laundering, a number of law enforcement, 
control and supervisory state institutions are operating 
in Bulgaria - Specialized Administrative Directorate 
"Financial Intelligence" of the State Agency for Na-
tional Security (SAD FR - SANS), Ministry of the Inte-
rior, the Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Bulgaria, 
the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB), the Controlling 
Agencies at the Ministry of Finance, etc. 
The following report analyzes the SANS 'control 
activity with regard to credit institutions in the area of 
"money laundering" on the basis of historical data pub-
licly disclosed through annual reporting documents5. 
Realizing its core business, incl. falling under the scope 
of the Law on Measures Against Financing of Terror-
ism, the Commercial Banks are subject to constant mon-
itoring and control by the specialized administrative di-
rectorate "Financial Intelligence" of SANS, which has 
neither operational functions nor disclosure functions 
criminal activity but has a legal basis for collecting in-
formation without limitation from banking, official, pro-
fessional or other secrecy as a mediating unit to speed 
up and facilitate information exchange between finan-
cial welfare and law enforcement systems. 
Based on the applicable legal norms, among the 
main functions (the results from which will be analyzed 
below) implemented by the Directorate, incl. and in re-
spect of commercial banks, the following are men- 
tioned6: organizing and conducting trainings related to 
                                                        
1 The organization that sets standards in countering money laundering and terrorist financing. 
2 An organization responsible for Europe for the prevention of money laundering. 
3 See https://www.egmontgroup.org/. 
4 See http://www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm#classification. 
5 The analytical part of the present report (including the figures and the tables) is summarized and processed by the author 
on the basis of published annual reports of the SAD FR - SANS (http://www.dans.bg/bg/msip-091209-menu-
bul/fidannualreports30052012-mitem-bul). 
6 See more art. 32e of the Regulations for Implementation of the State Agency for National Security Act (adopted with 
Decree of the Council of Ministers No 23 of 11.02.2008, promulgated in State Gazette, issue 17 of February 19, 2008, amended 
and supplemented SG .63 of 12 August 2016, SG No. 66 of 23 August 2016. 
the implementation of the LMML and the LMFTS; on-
going and incidental control of the banking activity for 
the fulfillment of the obligations under the LMML and 
LMFT; drafting of acts of con vention, acts for estab-
lishing administrative violations; developing reports of 
violations committed by credit institutions; performing 
joint inspections with the supervisory authorities (Bul-
garian National Bank); keeping registers of information 
received from commercial banks and others. 
As stated above, the Directorate's function of or-
ganizing and conducting trainings on the implementa-
tion of the LMMI is a priority, as the educational attain-
ment and the competencies acquired are a factor in in-
creasing effectiveness in the fight against money laun-
dering. Summing up the information published in the 
annual reports of the FAS - SANS, for the period 2012-
2016, the Directorate carried out a total of 73 trainings, 
resulting in the training of 2454 persons in the capacity 
of representatives of the Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants (ICPA), Commercial Banks, Non-Profit Legal 
Entities (NGOs), the National Revenue Agency (NRA), 
real estate agents and others. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the 
number of trainings of commercial banks represented 
22% in the structure of the trainings, which gives them 
a second position after the trainings of representatives of 
the ICPA (26%). 
Similarly, commercial banks also occupy 14% of 
the number of trained persons, compared to 33% for the 
leader – ICPM. Considering that the number of banks 
(including their employees) operating on the Bulgarian 
market is considerably smaller than that of the certified 
accountants, it can be assumed that for the FAS – SANS 
the commercial banks are priority institutions with re-
gard to the prevention of money laundering, mainly be-
cause of their specific activity – operating not only on 
their own, but also on attracted money, which poses a 
serious risk to their real origin. For the next 10% com-
parison, the number of trainings conducted by represent-
atives of NGOs and NRA, followed by 7% by the real 
estate agents. The remaining 25% are outside the reach 
of the positioning, as they include all training with a 
share of less than 5% in the total number of courses, incl. 
investment intermediaries, management companies, in-
surers, insurance intermediaries, financial institutions, 
pension insurance companies, Financial Supervision 
Commission (FSC), leasing companies, lawyers, postal 
operators, private enforcement agents, traders, notaries, 
state and local bodies. 
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Fig. 1. Structure of the trainings conducted by SAD FR-SANS in connection  
with the implementation of the LMML and the LMFT (2012-2016) 
 
Following the above considerations, the factual 
data showing the persistence in the training of two cate-
gories of institutions throughout the analyzed period, in-
cluding the commercial banks with two trainings and  
50 trained persons in the first year – 2012 (the lowest 
values for the period) and five training sessions with  
150 trained persons in 2015 (the highest values for the 
period). Concerning the others presented, trainings were 
carried out once (NRA – 2012) or a maximum of twice 
(NGOs and real estate agents – 2012 and 2014) through-
out the time slice. 
The performance of checks on commercial banks' 
activities on the implementation of anti-money launder-
ing measures and suspicions of money laundering is also 
among the main activities of FAS SAD. For the period 
2011-2016, the Directorate exercised control over the 
activities of credit institutions through a total of 44 in-
spections, of which 20 thematic and 20 planned (missing 
information on the nature of the inspections in 2011). As 
can be seen from the information published in the re-
porting documents, the highest concentration is ob-
served in 2015 (12), and the main reason is the reported 
increased risk of money laundering through commercial 
banks, established in monitoring their operations by re- 
gularly reporting information and suspicious payment 
information to the relevant authorities. 
For comparison, the verified commercial banks oc-
cupy the fourth position (7%) in the structure of the  
FAD – SANS (see Fig. 2), performed by the exchange 
offices (13%), notaries (12%) and accountants 8%), 
which is another proof that commercial banks, as the 
                                                        
1 See Dochev, H., Challenges of the New Legal Entities on the European Internal Market, in Izas Economics and Practice 
in the Process of the Supplementation of the European Union, Nis, 2007, pp. 319-330. Dochev, Х., Supranational economic 
entities in the economy of the European Union, National Economic Archives, 2007/3, pp. 18-26. 
only credit institution among the listed ones, are a po-
tential "money laundering" incubator, and the fifth posi-
tion with almost 7% is for insurers1. The category  
"others" is again aggregated and covers audited entities 
with a share of 5% and less than 5% of all registered, 
including auditors, lawyers, pension insurance compa-
nies, health insurance companies, NGOs, organizers and 
gambling companies, wholesalers, real estate, pawn-
shops, and more. 
The control over the commercial banks is an acti- 
vity in which the SAD FR – SANS interacts with other 
state bodies, performs joint inspections with the super-
visory body – Bulgarian National Bank. Officially re-
leased information points to persistence throughout the 
analyzed period, with joint inspections reaching three in 
2014 and 2015, two in two and one in 2012. 
For comparison, the work of FAS – SANS with 
other supervisors significantly exceeds that of the BNB 
(11%), but here again the number of credit institutions 
operating on the market and that of the FSC and the 
State Commission gambling (DHS) economic agents. 
The joint inspections with the FSC and DCH authorities 
have a relative value of 19.5% over the whole timeframe 
(see Fig. 3). The reason for the NRA's competencies and 
the maximum values for interaction with the FAS – 
SANS (50%) is obvious – the nature of the work and the 
scope of the revenue administration, the implementation 
of anti-money laundering measures and measures 
against terrorist financing and suspicion of money laun-
dering and terrorist financing. 
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Fig. 2. Structure of on-the-spot inspections carried out by SAD FR-SANS in connection  
with the implementation of the LMML (2011-2016) 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Structure of the joint inspections carried out by SAD FR-SANS  
with other supervisors (2012-2016) 
  
The logical conclusion of the control activities of 
the FD – SANS in respect of the commercial banks for 
the fulfillment of their obligations under the LMML, as 
well as the acts for their implementation, is the drawing 
up of the findings of acts, the establishment of adminis-
trative violations (AEAV) under the LMML and the 
preparation draft criminal drafts. The reporting of viola-
tions by commercial banks has focused on analyzing the 
violations and proposing the measures to be taken to 
eradicate the consequences of and to prevent future vio-
lations. 
For the period 2012-2016, the specialized financial 
intelligence directorate compiled and handed out to the 
credit institutions a total of 74 acts for the establishment 
of administrative violations, incl. non-declaration of 
origin of funds by the client, non-declaration of the 
origin of the funds by a client in the case of a transfer 
order, failure to submit the required documents, failure 
to identify the client, failure to report the suspicion, no 
notifications for cash payments over BGN 30000 and 
others. (see Table 1). The leading position among com-
mercial banks violations is the failure to report suspicion 
(according to Article 11 (2) of the LMML) – Acts 
(AEAV) have a relative share of 20% of the total, fol-
lowed by the non-identification of persons who are ac-
tual owners of a client – 18%, no request for a declara-
tion of origin – 11% and no notification for cash pay-
ments of more than BGN 30000, performed by a client 
(under Article 16, paragraph 1 of the MIPD) – 11%. 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Exchange bureaus
Notaries
Accountants
Commercial banks
Insurers
Investment intermediaries / management
companies
Others
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Bulgarian National Bank
Financial Supervision Commission
State Gambling Commission
National Revenue Agency
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Table 1 
Acts for establishing administrative violations (AEAV/pcs) of commercial banks (2012-2016)  
drawn up and served by SAD Financial Intelligence - SANS1 
Types of acts for establishing administrative violations 2012-2016 
1 Acts for not requiring a declaration of origin of the funds (Article 4, paragraph 7 of the 
LMML) 8 
2 Acts for non-identification of the persons who are actual owners of a client - legal entity 
(Article 6, paragraph 2 of the LMML) 13 
3 Acts for non-declaration of origin of funds by a client upon ordering a translation, in the 
part of the declaration under Art. 4, para. 7 of the LMML, equivalent to an unrepresented 
declaration, on the grounds of Art. 4, para. 4 of the LMML should have refused the opera-
tion. (Article 4 (4) of the LMML)  5 
4 Acts for non-submission of documents under Art. 8 of the LMML (Article 9 of the LMML) 
and Art. 17, para. 8 of the LMML 7 
5 Acts of incomplete customer identification (Article 4, paragraph 1, paragraph 2, paragraph 
3 of the LMML) 5 
6 Acts for failure to notify cash payment of more than BGN 30,000 or their equivalent in 
foreign currency, made by or to a client of the liable person (Article 11a of the LMML) 7 
7 Acts for non-notification within the term under Art.16, para.1 of the MIPD for payment in 
cash amounting to more than BGN 30 000 per client 8 
8 Acts for non-fulfillment of the provision of Art. 4, para. 4 of the LMML 1 
9 Acts for non-reporting of doubt (Article 11, paragraph 2 of the LMML) 15 
10 Acts for unresolved inconsistencies in the VPPIPPFT draft and re-submitting them to the 
Chairman of the State Agency for National Security for approval (Article 19, paragraph 3 
of the MIPD) 1 
11 Acts for failing to carry out an expanded verification of customer identification information 
(Article 8 (7) of the MIPD) 2 
12 Acts for failing to notify the SAD FR-SANS about the replacement of the head of the SSCI-
PHIP (Article 21, paragraph 2 of the MIPD) 1 
13 Acts for not observing all complex or abnormally large transactions or transactions, as well 
as any transactions and operations that do not have a clear economic or legal purpose (Ar-
ticle 7b of the LMML) 1  
TOTAL: 74 
 
For comparison, the established AEAV of the com-
mercial banks accounted for 15% of all drawn up and 
handed over by the FAS – SANS during the analyzed 
period – 507 (see Fig. 4) as a result of the sanctions im-
posed on all AAVs, amounting to almost BGN 839 thou-
sand, with a clear upward trend from the beginning to 
the end of the analyzed period – 2012-2016. 
According to the applicable regulations, commer-
cial banks are obliged to report to the FAD – SANS the 
so-called dubious operations. As such, financial opera-
tions are classified and, after further studies by bank em-
ployees, it is not possible to clarify their nature, which 
is sufficient reason to be assigned a higher risk and to 
report them to the Financial Intelligence Agency. The 
official information sources indicate that 10930 suspi-
cious transactions were reported for the period 2011-
2016, 76% of which were commercial banks and the 
other from other institutions (see Fig. 5). 
                                                        
1 The information is summarized and processed by the author on the basis of published annual reports of FAS - SANS 
(http://www.dans.bg/bg/msip-091209-menu-bul/fidannualreports30052012-mitem-bul). 
 
Fig. 4. Structure of the Documents Established and 
Delivered by SAD Financial Intelligence – SANS 
Documents for Establishing Administrative Of-
fenses under the LMML (2012-2016) 
Acts for establishing administrative violations handed over to commercial
banks
Acts for establishing administrative violations handed over to other
institutions
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Fig. 5. Sources of suspicious transaction reports 
(CSD) for 2011-2016 
  
The analyzed reports show that the number of re-
ports of suspicious transactions under the LMML and 
LMFT from the commercial banks to the FAS – SANS 
WADA has an upward trend, in 2011 it is 1035 and in 
2016 it is 2390, ie. there is over 130% growth within the 
observed time span. It should be borne in mind that in 
the structure of generally reported suspicious transac-
tions by year, commercial banks' DSBs take values of 
69% in 2012 (minimum) to 82% in 2015 (maximum), 
regardless of the above-mentioned upward trend the an-
alyzed period, due to the fluctuations in the value of 
DSOs by other institutions. 
In view of the above analysis and the stability of 
commercial banks, and in order to prevent the use of the 
money laundering system, in line with the principles of 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the first 
and most important defense against money laundering is 
the ambition of bank management to protect its credit 
institution from dealing with criminal persons or engag-
ing in criminal schemes by strictly enforcing customer 
identification and identifying the actual owner of the ac-
counts. As a consequence, banks should not maintain re-
lationships, enter into transactions, or execute transac-
tions and order clients who can not provide evidence of 
the legitimate origin of the funds they hold. 
In the process of globalization, the prevention of 
money laundering also requires effective permanent 
communication and active interaction both between the 
state institutions and between them and the persons 
obliged by the law, and credit institutions. In addition, 
the obligated persons should also observe the legal pro-
visions, as well as write internal policy, incl. rules and 
procedures to prevent their use for the purposes of crim-
inal schemes. As the processes of identification and as-
sessment of bank customers, as well as those related to 
the monitoring of banking operations and the definition 
of some of them as suspect by Chief Operating Officer, 
of the existing risk, are complex, credit institutions 
should meet their needs from an adequate material base, 
incl. specialized software applications, time resource, 
expert potential. At the same time, the improvement and 
modernization of the national and supranational regula-
tory framework is a sine qua non for realistic countering 
of the latest criminal practices for which credit institu-
tions are also a priority. 
In summary, the main statement in this paper pro-
vides the basis for the following conclusions: 
First. The legalization of criminal assets is based 
on existing imperfections in the current system of pre-
vention and counteraction of these processes, with credit 
institutions ranked among the main money laundering 
mechanisms, which is a prerequisite for the eventual oc-
currence of risk situations for itself bank and for its cli-
ents. 
Second. On a national scale, commercial banks 
have been constituted as a priority subject of continuous 
monitoring and control by the specialized administrative 
directorate "Financial intelligence" of SANS in connec-
tion with the application of numerous regulations and 
institutions concerning the role of banks in complying 
with the legal norms against laundering money, as well 
as for the purpose of exploring, analyzing and disclosing 
information received under the terms and conditions of 
the LMML. 
Third. In order to have anti-money laundering ef-
fects, it is necessary to develop and strictly implement 
policies both nationally and internationally, to be imple-
mented in close cooperation and constant communica-
tion between the responsible institutions. At the same 
time, each commercial bank should develop its own 
anti-money laundering policy that contains adequate 
measures to counteract these crimes and their applica-
tion to "block" the relationship between credit institu-
tions and criminals. 
Fourth. Measures to prevent money laundering 
should be aimed at: identifying customers and actual 
owners and taking appropriate action to verify their 
identification; customer assessment by Ch. the risk of 
money laundering; monitoring customer operations; dis-
closure of information (reporting) about suspicious 
transactions and transactions. 
Fifth. For the period 2012 - 2016, SAD FR-SANS 
conducted a total of 73 trainings on the implementation 
of the LMML and LMFT with trained 2454 persons, in-
cluding commercial banks with 22% of the total train-
ings and 14% of the total trainees. identifies them as pri-
ority institutions for the prevention of money launder-
ing, mainly because of their specific activities – operat-
ing not only on their own, but also on attracted money, 
posing a serious risk to their real origin. 
Sixth. In the structure of inspections carried out for 
the period 2011-2016 by the SAD FR-SANS (611), the 
commercial banks checked (according to the LMML) 
occupy the fourth position (7%) after the verified ex-
change bureaus (13%), notaries (12%). and accountants 
(8%), which is another proof that commercial banks, as 
Suspicious transaction reports (commercial banks)
Suspicious transaction reports (other institutions)
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the only credit institution among the listed ones, are a 
potential "money laundering" incubator. 
Seven. The established and served by the State 
Agency for Refugees State Agency for Administrative 
Discrimination (AAVS) under the LMML of commer-
cial banks make up 15% of all prepared in the period 
2012-2016 – 507. The top position among the commer-
cial bank violations is the failure to report a doubt1 – 
20%, followed by the non-identification of the persons 
who are the actual owners of the client (YU) – 18%, the 
non-application of a declaration of origin – 11% and the 
failure to notify cash payments of value over BGN 
30000, performed by a client2 - 11%. 
Eighth. During the period 2011-2016, 10930 sus-
picious transactions under the LMML and LMFT were 
reported to the SAD FR – SANS, of which 76% of the 
commercial banks (with over 130% growth within the 
observed time interval) and the rest from the other insti-
tutions. For the same period, notifications of payment 
transactions in cash over BGN 30000, 99% (251600) 
were reported by the commercial banks, and their rela-
tive share varied between 98% and 99% during the same 
period, which is sufficient grounds for taking the neces-
sary legal measures to prevent money laundering. 
 
*** 
Global policy on combating money laundering 
places the activities of credit institutions within the 
scope of the legal norms and focus, in order to prevent 
their use for the implementation of criminal schemes. 
The present study is sufficient grounds, on a national 
scale, for commercial banks to be constituted as a prior-
ity subject of continuous monitoring and control by the 
specialized administrative directorate "Financial Intelli-
gence" of SANS in order to investigate, analyze and dis-
close information obtained by the order and at the terms 
of the LMML, as they are obviously among the main 
options used for money laundering purposes. This is a 
good reason for credit institutions to create strict and 
transparent internal bank rules and procedures to be re-
spected when selecting clients and executing financial 
operations and to prioritize their prevention against 
money laundering and financing of terrorism. 
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У сучасному світі глобалізація дає можливість 
економічним агентам здійснювати вільне транскор-
донне переміщення фінансових ресурсів і через банків-
ську систему без будь-яких особливих перешкод і в по-
шуках сприятливого місця для високої віддачі. Це, од-
нак, потенційна можливість легалізації як грошей, 
отриманих від злочинної діяльності, так і в результаті 
схем відмивання грошей, здійснюваних через комер-
ційні банки. Метою даного дослідження є визначення 
ролі комерційних банків як механізму відмивання гро-
шей шляхом подання їх невід'ємних характеристик в 
рамках Спеціального закону про боротьбу з відмиван-
ням грошей і оцінки їх важливості в якості постійного 
контролю та контролю за дотриманням застосовних 
стандартів проти вищевказаних злочинів.  
Ключові слова: комерційні банки, відмивання 
грошей, кримінальні схеми. 
 
Димитрова Т. Коммерческие банки в схемах 
уголовных денег 
В современном мире глобализация дает возмож-
ность экономическим агентам осуществлять свобод-
ное трансграничное перемещение финансовых ресур-
сов и через банковскую систему без каких-либо осо-
бых препятствий и в поисках благоприятного места 
для высокой отдачи. Это, однако, потенциальная воз-
можность легализации как денег, полученных от пре-
ступной деятельности, так и в результате схем отмыва- 
ния денег, осуществляемых через коммерческие банки.  
 
 
 
 
Целью данного исследования является определение 
роли коммерческих банков в качестве механизма от- 
мывания денег путем представления их неотъемлемых 
характеристик в рамках Специального закона о борьбе 
с отмыванием денег и оценки их важности в качестве 
постоянного контроля и контроля за соблюдением 
применимых стандартов против вышеуказанных пре-
ступлений. 
Ключевые слова: коммерческие банки, отмывание 
денег, уголовные схемы. 
 
Dimitrova Т. Commercial banks in criminal 
money laundering schemes 
In today's world, globalization provides an oppor-
tunity for economic agents to carry out free cross-border 
movement of financial resources, and through the banking 
system, without any particular obstacles and in search of a 
favorable location for high returns. This, however, is a po-
tential opportunity and the money obtained from criminal 
activity to obtain legal origin through established money 
laundering schemes implemented through commercial 
banks. The purpose of this study is to outline the role of 
commercial banks as a money laundering mechanism by 
presenting their inherent characteristics within the scope of 
the Special Money Laundering Act1 (LMML) and to assess 
their importance as a permanent monitoring and control of 
compliance with the applicable standards against the above 
crimes. 
Keywords: commercial banks, money laundering, 
criminal schemes. 
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